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Abstract  
 Despite a common agreement that environmental and occupational 
health & safety professionals must learn about risk early in formal education, 
such matters still remain underrepresented in most education programs. This 
paper describes the development and use of an instructional material aimed 
at exploring and improving health & safety professionals’ understanding on 
what risk really means, and on what is needed to its technical assessment. 
After reading a text depicting the technical and contextual aspects of 
unintended technological accidents, participants were asked to rank such 
events regarding its risk. Next, they had to explain what criteria they 
adopted, and also to compare their results with reference values, discussing 
the differences. Participants’ statements were collected and compiled. The 
ensuing discussion involved the resignification of the ideas raised by them, 
introducing the scientific meaning into a technical context. The proposed 
practice presented consistent results becoming an alternative resource to 
teach risk in a way participants share opinions based on their previous 
knowledge and begin to deal with the idea of evaluating risks in a 
scientifically reasoned basis. 
 
Keywords: Continuing education; risk; risk assessment; occupational health 
& safety 
 
Introduction 
 Risk is inherent to everyday life. In its simplest meaning, it can be 
seen as a concept created by humans to give meaning and to cope with 
dangerous situations and with uncertainties of ordinary life (Slovic & Weber, 
2002). In spite of that, meanings of risk concepts have changed and evolved 
over time (Aven, 2012; Jackson, Allum, & Gaskell, 2006). Among different 
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connotations regarding the use of the word ‘risk’, its association with 
anything that could cause harm; its use to express the assessment of 
probability and extent of adverse outcomes; and the weighing of gain and 
losses, e.g. cost/benefit analysis, are more often found (Aven, 2010; Zinn, 
2008). 
 In literature, several definitions can be found for the concept of risk. 
Many authors exhaustively wrote about and discussed such concepts, its 
rationales, strengths and weaknesses (Aven, 2012; Aven, Renn, & Rosa, 
2011; Zinn, 2008; Boholm, 2012). Despite the lack of a commonly accepted 
definition, the distinction of reality and possibility is a shared element in all 
risk concepts, either in science or in public understanding (Aven & 
Kristensen, 2005; Renn, 1998b; ISO, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). According to 
Althaus (Althaus, 2005), “the conceptual understanding of risk conveys risk 
to be something that is open to a multitude of converse possibilities and 
interpretations” (p. 570). Such possibilities and interpretations were 
developed and used according to the needs of specific disciplines and areas. 
 Along with semantic and ontological discussions, man-made risks are 
increasingly becoming part of human environment and must be recognized 
and understood to be properly managed (International Risk Governance 
Council [IRGC] , 2005; 2010; European Agency for Safety and Health at 
Work, 2013; Cleeland, 2011; Takala & Hamalainen, 2009; Koukoulaki, 
2010). During the past 40 years, the field of risk analysis has grown rapidly, 
focusing on issues such as identification, quantification, and characterization 
of threats to human health and to the environment, as well as its respective 
communication, mitigation, and decision making process (Slovic & Weber, 
2002; Hovden, Albrechtsen, & Herrera, 2010; Badri, Gbodossou, & Nadeau, 
2012). 
 From the technical-scientific point of view, risk can be considered an 
objectively measurable or observable event or danger (Aven, 2011; Aven, 
2012a; ISO, 2009a; ISO, 2009b; ISO, 2009c). Risk assessment, in its turn, 
comprises the scientific process of defining the components of risk 
quantitatively, semi-quantitatively, or qualitatively (Zalk & Nelson, 2008). It 
is based on experts’ empirical calculation of the probability of event 
occurrence and the amount or extent of damage, excluding societal and 
subjective factors of such calculations, as much as possible (Singley, 2004). 
 According to the US Environmental Protection Agency, “risk is the 
chance of harmful effects to human health or to ecological systems, 
resulting from exposure to an environmental stressor” (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2012). The Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and 
Safety defines risk as “the likelihood or probability that a person will be 
harmed or experience an adverse health effect if exposed, under a given 
condition, to a hazard, which in turn comprises a wide range of sources, such 
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as substances; situations; processes or practices” (Canadian Centre for 
Occupational Health and Safety, 2006; 2009). 
 In addition, risk assessment can be defined as a comprehensive 
process carried out to estimate the probability of adverse effects on human 
health and environment, as a consequence of exposure to a specific hazard or 
to an environmental stressor. It aims at ensuring that living beings, as well as 
the environment, will not be negatively impacted or impaired. It involves: (i) 
hazard identification; (ii) exposure evaluation, taking into account both the 
severity and the likelihood of an injury or illness occur; and (iii) evaluation 
of the risk associated with each hazard. Risk assessment also allows the 
identification of actions that, once put in place, effectively eliminate or 
control the risk (Alli, 2008; Pickering & Cowley, 2010). 
 To this end, if either the risk is not recognized, or the meaning of risk 
is not clearly defined, risk assessment will certainly fail (Caponecchia, 
2010). To avoid failures during the process, professionals must be prepared 
to recognize multiple and context-dependent conceptions of risk, and make 
the assessment following rational scientific procedures, disregarding 
personal beliefs, emotions and values. 
 Education on environmental and occupational health & safety issues 
comprises, among others, learning about risk and its assessment tools 
(Covvit, Harris, & Anderson, 2013; Jonckheer & De Brouwer, 2009). 
However, tailoring up a proactive professional, conscious of what is at stake, 
and thus, able to avoid risk misjudgment, requires more than merely training 
programs on the use of such tools. Professionals must be prepared to think 
critically about risk, its different rationales and approaches, as well as be 
aware of both perceptual filters and contextual factors influencing risk 
assessment and management (Brosseau & Fredrickson, 2009; Borys, n.d.). 
 Despite a common agreement that risk must be taught early in formal 
education, such matter still remains underrepresented in most education 
programs (Gardner, Jones, Taylor, Forrester & Robertson, 2010; Zint, 2001; 
Covitt, Gomez-Schmidt, & Zint, 2005; Jonckheer & De Brouwer, 2009; 
Pisaniello et al., 2013; Rosen, Caravanos, Milek & Udasin, 2011). Many 
obstacles have already been identified to embed education on risk into 
curricula. Among them are: the lack of suitable instructional material for 
different educational levels; the fact that risk itself and its related matters are 
not seen as an academic content; and a lack of competence to approach the 
subject (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2010; National 
Research Council, 2000). 
 This paper describes the development and use of an instructional 
material aimed at fostering a discussion, exploring and enhancing health and 
safety professionals’ ideas and arguments on what risk really means, and on 
what is needed to its recognition and technical assessment. 
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Materials and methods 
Participants 
 The sample was composed of 142 participants divided into five 
independent groups. The participants were enrolled in short-duration training 
course (45 hours) on qualitative risk assessment of chemicals. This course 
was yearly offered from 2007 to 2011, in an institute focused on conducting 
research, training, and education in occupational safety & health issues. The 
groups were randomly constituted regarding gender, educational level and 
profession. Nevertheless, all participants worked at environmental or 
occupational related areas. Groups’ characteristics are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Groups’ characteristics. 
Group G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Participants      
n per group 19 38 21 40 24 
Female 10 13 14 20 10 
Male 9 25 7 20 14 
Educational Level      
Major degree 12 34 17 37 13 
High school or Technician certificate 7 4 4 3 11 
Area of expertise      
*Occupational Safety or Environmental 18 27 9 10 17 
**Occupational Health 1 11 12 27 -- 
*Engineer; architect; chemist; pharmacist; occupational safety technician; chemist 
technician; economist; human resource professional. **Including surveillance: physician; 
nurse; biologist; physical therapist; veterinarian; dentist; audiologist; social and human 
service assistant; political scientist. 
 
Instrument 
 The instrument comprises a reading material and a handout 
containing a single question and a table. The reading material was drawn up 
seeking to depict just the technical and contextual aspects of 14 unintended 
technological accidents and their outcomes for both science and society. It 
covered a comprehensive set of hazardous activities, including: 4 hazards 
associated with nuclear technology (Chernobyl, Chelyabisnk, Three Mile 
Island and Tokaimura); 4 hazards associated with chemical industry (Bhopal, 
Minamata, Seveso and Texas City); 3 hazards associated with medical and 
pharmaceutical industry (L-tryptophane, thalidomide and silicone implants); 
2 hazards associated to oil tankers (Exxon-Valdez and Prestige); and 1 
hazard associated to large constructions (Malpasset dam). The events were 
displayed alphabetically in the reading material and in the handout. 
 The description of the accidents was downloaded from data available 
at the Hazardcards Website (Learning Lab, 2005a). Hazardcards is a science 
communication educational resource aimed at fostering the debate about 
technological hazards (Learning Lab, 2005b; Nielsen, 2005). It is a card 
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game to be played like Top Trumps. In addition to a brief description of the 
accident, each card is broken down into the following categories: hazard, 
casualties, range, fear factor and media effect. Each category has a score 
value. In this work, besides the technical aspects and contextual 
consequences of the accidents, the Hazard score associated with such events 
was used. Such value was based on an expert assessment of the potential 
dangers of the technologies. Despite named as ‘hazard’, it is a risk 
assessment carried out using a variant of decision analysis and the normal 
accident theory (Learning Lab, 2005c). It is an expert evaluation that 
excludes factors such as cultural values, ethical principles, and democratic 
dialogue. It was named as expert reference value, used for comparison 
purposes only. 
 
Data collection and in-class discussion 
 The activity was administered to participants at the beginning of the 
training course. Firstly, they were asked to read the text described above. 
After that, participants were asked to rank such events at the handout, 
attributing score 1 to the highest risk and 14 to the lowest risk, ranking all the 
other events accordingly. Each participant completed the rank individually. 
There was no time for any specific preparation or discussion with other 
classmates. 
 Data was collected, analyzed and the findings were then orally 
discussed within groups. Discussions focused on why they scored the events 
in that way, what factors drew their attention, and what criteria were adopted 
for ranking. Respondents were not directly asked to judge the risk from a 
specific point of view, such as societal benefits, number of deaths, or 
complexity of the technology. 
 Next, participants compared their results with the expert reference 
values, and the differences formed the basis for further discussions regarding 
meanings of risk, risk perception and risk assessment. How and when these 
meanings intersected, confounded, and distinguished from each other was 
also discussed. 
 
Data analysis 
 Data was analyzed using SAS 9.2 for Windows. All statistical tests 
were performed adopting the significance level (α) 5% (p < 0.05). For each 
group, the ‘rank’ variable was obtained applying the Wilcoxon Scores test 
for the 14 events, according to the risk score attributed by the groups. 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used for ‘rank’ variable inter-groups comparison 
within each event. It tested the null hypothesis (H0) that all groups ranked the 
events in a similar way. The null hypothesis can be rejected when the 
significance of ChiSq (χ2) is less than α (computed p-value < 0.05). On the 
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other hand, if the statistic is not significant (p-value > 0.05) then no 
differences exist between the samples. 
 Pearson correlation coefficients (ρ) were calculated to verify whether 
there was a linear relationship inter-groups as well as the strength of the 
linear relationship. The larger the ρ value, the stronger the linear relationship 
(Cohen, 1988). The hypothesis about the linear relationship inter-groups was 
verified testing the level of statistical significance (p-value) of the correlation 
coefficient. The smaller the p value, the higher the relationship significance. 
Pearson correlation coefficients (ρ) were also calculated to verify the 
strength of the linear relationship between expert reference values and 
groups’ rank values. 
 Cronbach´s alpha was used as a measure of the internal consistency 
regarding rank ordering concordance inter-groups. It is an index of reliability 
associated with the variation accounted for by the true score of the variable 
that is being measured. Alpha coefficient ranges in value from 0 to 1 and the 
higher the score, the more reliable the generated rank is. 
 In addition, a so-called variable‘dif’ was obtained for each event 
within each group. It corresponds to the difference between the expert 
reference value and the groups’ rank value. The larger the ‘dif’ value, the 
larger the discrepancy between expert and groups’ opinion. Kruskal-Wallis 
test was used to check the null hypothesis (H0) that all groups framed and 
categorized events according to the hazards nature in a similar way. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Statistical analysis 
 Table 2 presents how the groups ranked the 14 events, regarding their 
risk. The low significance level of Kruskal-Wallis test (p > 0.05) indicates 
that the five groups interpreted most of the 14 events in a similar way. 
Exceptions were found to Exxon-Valdez (p-value 0.004), L-Tryptophane (p-
value 0.028), Prestige (p-value 0.04) and Thalidomide (p-value 0.027). 
Despite such minor differences, the standardized Cronbach’s alpha obtained 
value of 0.9547 suggests a strong internal consistency, thus reinforcing that 
the five different groups ranked the events in a very similar way. 
Table 2 Events ranking and statistical significance of inter-groups similarity. 
 a Rank 
b Kruskal-Wallis 
test 
 
c Ref. 
value G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 ChiSq p 
Bhopal 5 1 2 2 2 1 4.284 0.3689 
Chelyabinsk 1 3 3 3 3 3 5.303 0.2575 
Chernobyl 2 2 1 1 1 2 9.274 0.0546 
Exxon-Valdez 12 8 11 7 9 13 15.309 *0.0041 
L-Tryptophane 7 13 13 13 13 10 10.856 *0.0282 
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Malpasset 10 12 10 12 11 11 1.9849 0.7385 
Minamata 8 4 4 5 4 5 4.4433 0.3493 
Prestige 14 9 14 11 12 14 15.4307 *0.0039 
Seveso 9 5 5 4 5 6 7.4235 0.1151 
Silicone 
Implants 
11 14 12 14 14 12 7.5412 0.1099 
Texas City 13 6 8 6 6 8 5.0832 0.2789 
Thalidomide 6 11 7 10 8 4 10.9835 *0.0268 
Three Mile 
Island 
3 10 9 9 10 9 1.4734 0.8313 
Tokaimura 4 7 6 8 7 7 4.5916 0.3318 
a Wilcoxon Scores treatment (p < 0.0001); b inter-groups events similarity (p<0.05); c 
expert estimate (hazard value). 
 
 Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3. The ρ 
values higher than 0.7, coupled with computed p-values lower than 0.05, 
suggest a high significance level of a strong linear relationship inter-groups 
(G1 - G5), also indicating that events were ranked similarly by the groups. 
The obtained ρ values between 0.3 and 0.5 indicate a small to medium 
correlation of a linear relationship. Additionally, computed p-values near to, 
or higher than 0.05, indicate a lower significance level of the statistical test. 
Once coupled, such results indicate differences between expert analysis and 
groups’ analysis (G1, G3, G4). The obtained ρ values higher than 0.6 
(medium to strong correlation of a linear relationship), coupled with 
computed p-values lower than 0.05, suggest similarities between expert 
analysis and G2 and G5 groups’ analysis. Nevertheless, inter-groups analysis 
presents even higher ρ values and lower p-values. 
Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficients. 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
Group 1 1  
 
   
Group 2 0.85495 
p < 0.0001 
1    
Group 3 0.97363 
p < 0.0001 
0.88571 
p < 0.0001 
1   
Group 4 0.95165 
p < 0.0001 
0.95604 
p < 0.0001 
0.96923 
p < 0.0001 
1  
Group 5 0.73626 
p < 0.0027 
0.93846 
p < 0.0001 
0.76703 
0.0014 
0.87253 
p < 0.0001 
1 
Ref. value 0.39780 
p = 0.1590 
0.67033 
p = 0.0087 
0.45495 
p = 0.1022 
0.52527 
p = 0.0537 
0.72747 
p = 0.0032 
 
 The 14 events, grouped according to hazard category, are presented 
in Table 4. The variable‘dif’ corresponds to the difference between the expert 
reference value and groups’ rank value (Table 2). The larger the ‘dif’ value, 
the larger the discrepancy between expert and groups’ analysis. Additionally, 
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positive ‘dif’ values indicate that the risk within such event was 
overestimated by the groups and negative ‘dif’ values indicate risk 
underestimation by the groups. The high significance level of Kruskal-Wallis 
test indicates that the five groups framed the events according to its hazards 
categories. 
Table 4 Events displayed into hazard categories. 
Hazard category 
Event 
 
difG1 
 
difG2 
 
difG3 
 
difG4 
 
difG5 
Chemicals      
Bhopal 4 3 3 3 4 
Minamata 4 4 3 4 3 
Seveso 4 4 5 4 3 
Texas City 7 5 7 7 5 
Nuclear      
Chelyabinsk -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
Chernobyl 0 1 1 1 0 
Three Mile Island -7 -6 -6 -7 -6 
Tokaimura -3 -2 -4 -3 -3 
Environment (oil)      
Exxon-Valdez 4 1 5 3 -1 
Prestige 5 0 3 2 0 
Medical      
L-Tryptophane -6 -6 -6 -6 -3 
Silicone Implants -3 -1 -3 -3 -1 
Thalidomide -5 -1 -4 -2 2 
Construction      
Malpasset -2 0 -2 -1 -1 
*p<0.0001 (Kruskal-Wallis test for hazard category) 
 
 The overall statistical analysis indicates no differences in groups’ 
final rank results, and great differences comparing the expert reference value 
and groups’ results. It also indicates that events’ risk score moved towards 
overestimation or underestimation (shifted positively or negatively) 
according to its hazards categories (Aragonés, Moyano, & Talayero, 2008; 
Sjöberg, Peterson, Fromm, Boholm, & Hanson, 2005). 
 Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that analyzing the reasons that 
led the groups to the reported results is not within the scope of this paper. 
Such behavior was expected and already stressed in literature (Schmidt, 
2004; Sjoberg, 2011; Sjöberg, 2000a, 2000b; Slovic & Västfjäll, 2010; 
Slovic, 1987). Instead, it focuses on showing to the participants that they 
adopted the same criteria to judge the risk and to score the events, inviting 
them to reflect upon it. Thenceforth, discuss their ideas and argumentations, 
organizing them, and introducing the concepts of risk, risk perception and 
risk assessment (as one of the course’s aims). These are the findings 
approached in the following section. 
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In-class discussions 
 The results presented in Tables 2 and 4 were discussed within 
respective groups. In such occasion, participants were encouraged to 
describe what they adopted as criteria for ranking the risk events and the 
reasons why those criteria were adopted by them. The groups’ responses also 
converged and are described below. 
 It can be seen in Table 4, that the risk score of the events categorized 
as ‘Chemicals’ was overestimated (3-6 positions). All respondents described 
such events as an involuntarily imposed situation, where the real risk was 
unknown to those exposed, as well as to local authorities and emergency 
health services. Factors, such as high number of deaths, permanent 
impairment, long-term and delayed effects, omission from people in charge, 
environmental pollution and media coverage, were weighed and contributed 
to the overall analysis (Grasa, Navarro, Rubio, Pena, & Santamaria, 2002). 
 Risk score of the events categorized as ‘Environmental’ (in this case 
environmental pollution due to oil tankers accidents) was slightly 
overestimated (2 points). Despite the fact that the rank values for these 
events are not statistically the same, as demonstrated by p-value in Table 2, 
the five groups overestimated the risk associated with these events, to a 
greater or lesser extent (Table 4). In such case, neglecting of duty and 
environmental pollution of large areas were predominantly reported by the 
groups as ranking criteria. 
 The risk score of events set up as ‘Medical’ hazards were, in general, 
underestimated. Taking L-tryptophane as a vitamin supplement was strongly 
underestimated (5 points), clearly because all respondents considered it as a 
voluntary risk. Thalidomide was slightly underestimated (2 points) because 
respondents also considered, in some way, taking medicines as a voluntary 
risk, once it was prescribed for pregnancy sickness symptom relief. 
Moreover, participants argued that side effects were unknown, and, as soon 
as the problem was detected, the drug was taken off the market and the 
prescription for pregnant women suspended. In this case, information 
reliability was also cited. Risks from silicone implants were underestimated 
(1 to 3 points). Participants considered it an aesthetic surgery procedure and 
not to a health problem, as a cardiac surgery, for instance. According to their 
comments, the casualties were spread throughout the years, not concentrated 
on a specific geographic area or on a specific population. Besides 
voluntariness, participants also considered it as a non-catastrophic and easily 
controllable situation. 
 Events categorized as ‘Nuclear’ hazards are ranked as the first 4 
events according to the expert estimates. The degree of interdependence 
among systems components (i.e. people, equipment and procedures) of the 
nuclear technology is very high. Usually, accidents are fatal and control 
European Scientific Journal April 2016 edition vol.12, No.12  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
20 
measures are very complex (Venables, Pidgeon, Simmons, Henwood, & 
Parkhill, 2009). As presented in Table 4, with the exception of Chernobyl, 
which was slightly overestimated, the 3 other events were underestimated by 
the five groups. Chelyabinsk remained among the first four events in the 
rank, as well as Chernobyl. Its risk score was not at the top of the list, as 
were experts’ estimates, but is ranked amongst the first three positions. Three 
Mile Island risk score, on the other hand, was strongly underestimated (6 
positions). According to participants’ opinion, the accident was controlled in 
time. The population was evacuated and no deaths were registered. 
Tokaimura accident was slightly underestimated (3 points). Participants 
argued that in spite of being a nuclear accident, there was no explosion or 
massive release of radioactive material. Despite the small amount of 
radioactive material released, local population was evacuated, and in 
participants’ point of view, protected by authorities (those in charge of taking 
decisions). Furthermore, few deaths were registered and delayed effects were 
not reported. Participants considered that, in some way, the situation was 
under control. 
 At last, Malpasset Dam accident, a ‘Construction’ hazard, was 
slightly underestimated. When asked, respondents considered such accident 
as having a relatively minor impact compared with the others. 
 Gathering all the described characteristics together, some 
observations could be made within each group. Firstly, the events were 
interpreted and judged according to common criteria within each group 
(intra-groups and also inter-groups). Secondly, risk acceptability was framed 
according to hazards categories (Aragonés et al., 2008). Thirdly, there was a 
remarkable difference between expert analysis and groups’ analysis 
(Sjöberg, 1999). 
 At this point, some questions were directed at the students, taking 
into account the above observations. They were asked about what drove the 
ranking process and why there were so many differences between expert 
estimates and groups’ analysis, as well as the reliability and suitability of the 
adopted criteria. Participants were encouraged to observe their own 
evaluation regarding the risk of the activities, substances and technologies 
under discussion and compare their analysis with expert estimates. 
 After comparing the results, participants could realize that their 
adopted criteria for risk analysis, and thus to risk acceptability, were not 
technical and scientific ones. Judgment values and criteria used to rank the 
events according to its risk were based on qualitative characteristics. Among 
them: voluntariness, misinformation, media coverage, omission, control or 
lack of control over the activity, permanent impairment, long-term and 
delayed effects, nature of the hazard, and promptness response (Renn, 2004; 
Stewart, Luria, Reid, Lyons, & Jarvis, 2010). For instance, not only the 
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number of deaths, but also the cause and manner of death, which evoke 
feelings of dread to different extents, clearly influenced the risk 
acceptability. Deaths from risks imposed involuntarily, from risks considered 
out of one’s control, or from particularly dread activity were given greater 
weight in groups’ risk acceptability. In their opinion, deaths arising from a 
chemical plant accident were considered ‘much worse’ than deaths or 
impairment caused by taking medicines or as a consequence of floods. 
Malpasset dam collapse exemplifies this statement. Despite the high number 
of casualties, such accident was clearly associated to natural hazards 
(Terpstra, 2011). Small cracks had already been discovered in the dam wall 
and grew rapidly, population was given no warnings; and even so, 
participants attributed the accident to the abnormal rain that caused the dam 
rupture. These observations corroborate to the fact that large constructions 
are perceived as a benefit by general public, thus enhancing risk acceptability 
(Renn, 2004). Regarding the nature of the hazard, it was also clear that some 
hazard categories were more feared than others. Accidents categorized as 
chemical and environmental hazards were shifted positively (less 
acceptable), while those categorized as construction, medical and nuclear 
were shifted negatively (more acceptable). This is known as ‘framing before 
hazard’, another subjective perception characteristic of real risks (Lima, 
2004). 
 During the ensuing discussion, participants were introduced to the 
expression ‘risk perception’, aiming to provide a scientific meaning to the 
estimate based on emotions and subjective values carried out by them, e.g. 
fear, feelings of dread, and threat among second and third party people 
(Renn, 2004; Slovic, 1987). They could notice that risk, in the proposed 
activity, was evaluated according to their subjective perceptions, an 
experiential mode of thinking in which facts and information are filtered 
through social and cultural perceptual lenses and, usually, also related to the 
extent to which the situation can be recalled or imagined (Dietz, Scott Frey, 
& Rosa, 1996; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Judgments 
were based not on what they critically knew about the event, substance or 
technology relying on scientific data, but rather handled by feelings 
regarding it. Values, emotions and beliefs came prior to risk analysis and 
directed the process. In such cases, the severity of outcomes of a hazard, 
rather than risk itself, overrules the overall analysis. And, as a consequence, 
the risk analysis tends to differ from expert estimates (Sjörberg, 1999; 2000). 
 Next, participants were asked to define the word risk. Multiple 
conceptions of risk, found in literature, were shown to them: risk as hazard; 
risk as probability; risk as consequence; and risk as potential adversity or 
threat (Renn, 2004; Slovic & Weber, 2002). Finally, as relevant outcomes 
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from this activity, some considerations were made and are outlined in the 
following paragraphs. 
 In a broad sense, “risk refers to the possibility that human actions or 
events lead to consequences (outcomes) that affect aspects of what humans 
value” (Renn, 1998b, p. 51). Nevertheless, risk means different things to 
different people and many factors underlie those meanings. In other words, 
something’s risk strongly depends on the semantic context in which the word 
risk is used, leading participants to realize that context matters in any risk 
assessment process (Renn, 1998a; ISO, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
 In technical risk assessment, defining context implies specifying what 
is at stake before calculating probabilities of unwanted consequences 
(Sjöberg, 2000a). Likelihood of negative outcomes, to be properly assessed 
within a well-defined context, requires hazard to be recognized according to 
a given value system, whatever it is. Otherwise, no confident results will be 
obtained (Renn, 1998a). 
 Value systems are fundamental in selecting and framing risks, and 
are closely related to social context. They comprise clear rules, statements or 
endpoints, without which technical risk assessment, known as a rule/reason 
based process tends to be replaced by an affect-driven process: the subjective 
perception and analysis of risk (Henwood, Pidgeon, Sarre, Simmons, & 
Smith, 2008). In such cases, risk itself arises from an intuitive and instinctive 
mode of thinking that transforms uncertainty and threatening aspects of the 
environment into affective responses to danger, such as fear, dread and 
anxiety (Slovic & Peters, 2006). A rule/reason based process, on the other 
hand, brings logic, reason and scientific deliberation to the risk assessment 
process and should reflect technical expertise and scientific knowledge as 
much as possible, since ‘real’ victims are at stake (Slovic et al., 2004). 
 Risk perception, according to Pidgeon et al, can be defined as 
“people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgments and feelings, as well as social or 
cultural values and dispositions that people adopt towards hazards” (Pidgeon, 
Hood, Jones, Turner, & Gibson, 1992, p. 89), or any issue of concern, and 
how they model the outcomes’ likelihood, costs and benefits (Sjöberg, 
2000a).Consequently, risk perception may not, and usually does not, agree 
with technical-scientific definition of risk and its assessment (Sjöberg, 1999). 
Perceived risk is a challenging aspect to cope with, since it pervades risk 
assessment process at every stage, from drawing context and hazard 
identification, to deciding endpoints and consequences to be considered into 
the analysis. Therefore, a careful identification and selection of concerns and 
of evaluative criteria are strongly necessary to eliminate subjectivity from the 
technical risk assessment process, whenever and wherever possible (Renn, 
1998a; Bostrom, 1997). 
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Conclusion 
 The activity allowed the word ‘risk’ to be explored by participants, 
simply by analyzing events, technologies and substances previously known, 
as well as comparing their analysis with expert analysis. 
 Participants’ opinions and statements regarding meanings of risk, risk 
perception and risk assessment were collected and compiled. The ensuing 
discussion involved the resignification of the ideas raised by the groups, 
giving them a scientific meaning inserted into a technical context. 
 More than deepening in one or another concept of risk, such activity 
gave the participants clues of what could be approached in more detail 
regarding risk universe, showing them the many dimensions that are inherent 
to risk analysis (e.g. social, cultural and scientific ones). It is an activity in 
which participants shared opinions based on their previous knowledge and 
began to deal with the idea of evaluating risk in a scientifically reasoned 
basis. 
 The proposed practice, developed as an attempt to overcome the lack 
of instructional resources to teach risk in an interactive way, presented 
consistent results for the five groups, and thus becoming an alternative 
resource to be used as an introductory practice in short duration courses. 
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